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The concept of risk that we typically apply in finance has important limitations, and 
sometimes it can even be a misconception. For long-term investors, volatility (price 
fluctuations of an asset) and beta (riskiness of an asset relative to the overall market) are 
poor guides to risk, defined as a permanent capital loss. Another proposition is that 
diversification is not always good because it takes away focus on the fundamentals. 
However, illiquidity can make good harvest for long term investors, but current 
regulations do not encourage institutional investors to hunt this premium. Also, I argue 
that “man” is better than “machine”, and that you should be sceptical towards investors 
that base their investment decisions solely on mathematical models and forecasting. 
Finally, I give some examples of the investment philosophy applied in Oslo 
Pensjonsforsikring (OPF). 
   
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper is about risk and about a critical view of the risk concepts we normally apply.1 
That said, my ambition is not to launch a formal criticism of theoretical aspects of risk in 
financial markets, nor to make you believe in one particular investment style or product. My 
intention is primarily to make people reflect on some of the things one often take for granted, 
and also to be a bit more sceptical of some of the risk measures portfolio managers typically 
apply when making investment decisions.  
 
When I first started to work with this paper, during the spring of 2007, I did not know how hot 
a topic this was going to be just a few months later. The market turmoil that escalated during 
the 3rd quarter of 2007 far exceeded almost everybody’s expectations. Adding to that the 
market correction that started in December, the second half of 2007 and the beginning of 2008 
must be considered an event - the existing perceptions of financial market risk proved 
inadequate. Even though most market participants felt that market conditions were 
deteriorating, few had enough conviction and foresight to act in a timely manner.  
 
Markets are fascinating. They always carry the potential to surprise you. 
 
 
Proposition: Forecasting is not a trading strategy  
 
The complexity and unpredictability of price movements in asset prices remain a puzzle. It is 
also a circular argument because if we assume that someone has built a working model, it will 
by definition not be a market anymore. Nevertheless, model building is still a dominant 
occupation in the financial industry.  
 
                                                 
1 I am grateful to Halvor Hoddevik at Arctic Securities for important comments to an earlier version, and to Jens 
Kristian Bøe and the rest of our fantastic crew at Oslo Pensjonsforsikring for comments and valuable 
discussions.  
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One reason might be the tradition for ranking analysts and managers according to their 
forecasting abilities. Few argue against the best prophets. This is probably because we all 
want to have foresight and because it is difficult to criticise someone when you yourself do 
not have anything better to offer.  
 
I do not believe in gurus that can project the future, and I do not think there are models that 
we can rely on to do consistently better than the famous random walk, at least not in efficient 
or near efficient markets. (Apparently we sometimes know a bit about the near future, but that 
could also be related to normal time adjustments or frictions). Thus, if you want to make 
excess returns on trading in markets with close to perfect competition like in currencies, credit 
markets or commodities you are probably unable to make money in the long run just by 
relying on your forecasting skills. A common example of this is when talented investment 
bank traders break out from the trading desk and fail because they no longer have access to all 
the flow information.  
 
The most important source of forecasting failure is that reality changes (Lucas critique). How 
obvious it might seem, I do not stop wondering about how much effort is being put into 
forecasting based on historical relationships. We assume that the relationship between risk 
and return is constant; we assume that correlations are constant; and we assume that there are 
patterns in the market and the economic cycles that repeat themselves more or less. This again 
is a key element in asset allocation, in trading strategy and in risk control. When these things 
suddenly change, people have to start calibrating their models once again, just until the next 
chock happens and the models again become obsolete.  
 
 
Proposition: Man is better than machine 
 
The 3rd quarter of 2007 illustrates how changes in risk behaviour suddenly can change the 
concept of risk. Taking a look at the drivers behind what many describes as a market 
dislocation in the credit market thus seems worthwhile.  
 
From my experience, the first phase of the correction did not emerge from observable changes 
in macro variables or in stock market related excesses, but rather from abrupt changes in risk 
aversion related to second round effects of the subprime crisis in the US housing market. 
When analysing market behaviour during the first phase of the correction (third quarter of 
2007) we find clear indications of profit taking and a rise in risk aversion. First, a negative 
relationship between year-to-date return pre-correction and relative performance during the 
correction indicates that investors typically sold out of positions with unrealized gains, and 
retained positions in loosing stocks. Second, negative relationships between year-to-date 
volatility and performance during the period of correction indicate that investors sold out 
stocks with high volatility.   
 
The turmoil started with a sudden increase in risk aversion related to a crisis in a growing, but 
still a rather minor part, of the US credit market. An extremely low level of credit spreads 
might have been a disturbing factor. Part of what we saw was a realignment of credit risk to a 
more normal level. But it nevertheless happened in a situation where at least corporate credit 
losses where stable at low levels. The main change in the market was probably that investors 
suddenly came to believe that the price of credit risk was too low and demanded a much 
higher risk premium and a higher level of transparency, covenants and collateral. 
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In the later phase of the turmoil (December 07/January 08), fundamental factors became more 
pronounced, it all emerged into a more classical type of equity market corrections related to 
lower growth expectations.  
 
Another important factor was that implied volatility in equity markets increased significantly 
and from very low levels. This increase appears even more pronounced when taking into 
account that there are arguments suggesting that expected volatility has decreased over the 
past years. One illustration is the possible relationship between volatility and PE-levels in the 
stock market. It is not unreasonable to assume that a low level of PEs compared to a historical 
average, which we have today, normally would imply that price fluctuations are smaller 
because the market price then would react less to changes in expected future earnings 
compared to a situation where multiples are stretched (figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Volatility and Price-Earnings Ratio for the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index. 
Source: Bloomberg 
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This argument is also indirectly supported by the literature of economic cycles where several 
people suggest that the level of volatility in economic cycles has decreased, and that global 
economic cycles will be softer and less dramatic than before2. This will normally suggest that 
cyclical swings in corporate earnings have decreased correspondingly. If all this is true, we 
might draw the conclusion that the increase in equity market volatility during the correction 
was dramatic. This could serve to explain why the impact on certain trading strategies became 
so devastating. 
 
In contrast to the big swings in expected volatility, the stock market behaved surprisingly well 
during the first phase of the correction. In fact, 2007 ended with a gain in the US equity 
market. Figure 2 illustrates the volatility of the stock market, measuring the annual ex post 
equity risk premium in the US over the past 105 years. 2007 (not in the chart) gave a small 
positive reading as the stock market yielded 5,5  % against a money market return of around 
5,0 %. So, while investors lost a lot of money on credit spreads, higher risk aversion did not 
immediately transform into a higher ex ante risk premium in the equity market. 
                                                 
2 See for example Bernanke (2004) 
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Figure 2. Annual and Rolling Ten-Year U.S. Premiums Relative to Bills, 1900–2005.  
Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton (2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
However, the rise in risk aversion was felt by some large and professional players. Figure 3 is, 
without naming names, an example from real life, illustrating my point about changes in risk 
behaviour. The chart illustrates monthly return in a hedge fund that made use of a variety of 
quant based trading strategies to create excess return. The fund had a reasonably good track 
record with a performance distribution that appeared to be well packed around a positive 
number. Thus, the fund should be categorized as a relatively low volatility fund. It goes 
without saying that this was before the final observation down to the left appeared. This 
month alone wiped out all historic gains. How was it possible to deliver a result so far off the 
mark without any pre-warnings?  
 
One important reason was strangely enough one of the main selling point for this fund, target 
volatility. 
 
 
Figure 3. Performance in a real life Hedge Fund. Monthly observations up until August 2007. 
 
 
 
 
The concept of target volatility is indeed appealing, taking the best out of rebasing strategies 
and securing a constant level of risk for the investor. However, this framework turned into a 
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mouse trap in August 2007.3 What went wrong? First, target volatility is simple to 
understand. The manager sets a level of risk for the total portfolio so that the desired risk level 
is higher than what comes out of the active positions alone. Then, he leverages the risk up to 
the desired level. When the risk level changes, he will just change gearing and keep total risk 
constant. Unfortunately, sometimes the manager has taken most of his bets in assets with low 
liquidity in order to enhance performance and harvest an illiquidity premium. When volatility 
suddenly increases, he is not able to deleverage fast enough because it is impossible to sell out 
of the long positions. Next, he is forced to either violate his target volatility, or to force the 
assets out in the market with correspondingly negative effects on performance.  
 
Behavioural finance has taught us that an investor typically hold on to his positions for too 
long because it is human to keep what you think is a good asset. Losses are further enhanced 
because people find it is hard to sell an asset for a price below cost. A computer trader will 
not do these mistakes. The most sophisticated programmers will even claim that it is 
important to remove the human factor completely from the investment decisions. This is part 
of what happened in August 2007. Several of the fantastic quant funds, where humans had 
been replaced by equations, did not listen to common sense. They where programmed to sell 
good assets in order to keep target volatility low, and buy the bad ones. As most modellers 
have access to similar data and methodologies, they started to chase the same deals, probably 
continuing to dislocations in the market.  
 
 
Proposition: Diversification is not always right 
 
The Government Pension Fund – Global in Norway has received international recognition for 
its work on diversification. Simply stated, the Fundamental Law of Active Management4, 
which is the term often used to describe the investment philosophy of the fund, states that you 
can increase the information ratio5 by increasing the number of uncorrelated bets with 
positive expected excess returns. This is well in line with common teaching and also well in 
line with most regulations that encourage fund managers to diversify their portfolios as much 
as possible. Concentration means higher risk in their opinion. So far so good. But correlations 
change, as they did during the recent market turmoil, and as they will do in the future, and 
even assets with low historic correlation can align under some market conditions.  
 
A Warren Buffet quote comes to mind: “Wide diversification is only required when investors 
do not understand what they are doing”. 
 
For mutual funds, a concentrated portfolio is typically considered to consist of 100-200 
positions. I find it hard even to find 100 acceptable investments in a normal portfolio 
universe. Why should one invest in 80 mediocre companies when one has already invested in 
20 good companies? Why does it take hundreds of stocks to achieve the desired 
diversification as long as you can find fewer stocks with unequal fundamental drivers? I 
believe there is an optimal trade off somewhere between the number of holdings and the 
expected excess return in the portfolio, probably somewhere between 20 and 50 positions.  
 
 
                                                 
3 The Government Pension Fund – Global in Norway seems to have walked straight into such a trap. 
4 Se http://www.norges-bank.no/Pages/Article____42409.aspx  
5 Information ratio is the annual excess return divided by the annual relative volatility (tracking error). 
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Diversification is good because it can increase the risk adjusted return in a portfolio. 
However, holding stocks for diversification purposes only makes no sense to me and gives no 
guarantee that the risk level is low. It is better to look for diversification across asset classes, 
rather than within. 
 
 
Proposition: Risk is not volatility or beta, but the permanent loss of capital 
 
The concept of risk as price swings or volatility has strong support in the financial industry. 
Value oriented investors, however, are critical of this definition perceiving risk as a 
permanent loss of capital. I find that critique appealing. A few examples illustrate the 
difference between the two ways of perceiving risk.  
 
First, we could consider a stock with a low market cap and a high level of free float. The 
investor base is widely diversified and there are no lead investors in the firm. As a 
consequence the share is subject to a lot of trading and has a high turnover. The firm is on the 
other hand delivering a stable cash flow and operates in a market with little macroeconomic 
risk. The volatility in the share price here is probably not reflecting the fundamental risk in the 
company.  
 
Second, we could consider a share with a large lead investor that completely dominates the 
company. Traders find the share uninteresting and analysts do not care much. The company 
however, is operating in a very risky market, is highly leveraged, and has an inexperienced 
management. This might be a situation where the operating risk is higher than what is 
reflected in the share price volatility. 
 
Value investors typically are less concerned about share price volatility, and more concerned 
about fundamental changes in the company. The investor should invest in companies where 
the share price does not fully reflect the intrinsic value of the company. How the investor 
might arrive at the intrinsic value is of course not irrelevant, but not at the heart of this 
discussion. The view is that the markets at times are out of line with fundamental values. 
Again I found a relevant quote from Warren Buffet: “Look at market fluctuations as your 
friend rather than your enemy; profit from folly rather than participate in it.”  
 
At this point critics might argue that volatility, given that the distribution of outcome is 
symmetric around the mean, is a pure reflection of the risk of a permanent capital loss and 
that there should be no contradiction between the two concepts. However, in order to validate 
this view one has to make a number of assumptions that generally apply in the CAPM-model6 
framework. Typically, this well established framework for analysing asset and portfolio risk, 
assumes efficient markets, normal distributions, rational expectations and perfect information. 
In real life, this is rarely the case. Price fluctuations in an asset can reflect a number of 
inefficiencies like asymmetric information, speculation (trend following strategies creating 
overshooting), scarce liquidity, corporate actions, fraud, political decisions and so on. Market 
volatility (and beta) does not distinguish between the reasons for price swings. 
 
                                                 
6 CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model) states that the risk to an asset is generated from systematic risk (market 
risk) and idiosyncratic risk (risk related to the specific asset and that can be diversified away).  There is a trade-
off between risk and expected return where the assets “beta” or riskiness relative to the overall market (that has a 
beta of one) determines the rate at which the assets future cash flow should be discounted. A higher beta implies 
a higher discount rate, which is in line with intuition.  
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Another important distinction is that measured betas may be quite misleading as models often 
do not discriminate between significant and insignificant betas. This way co-incident can 
happen to represent the risk level of an asset.  
 
The CAPM framework is essential in understanding why the concept of diversification has 
such a strong support. In this model, diversification reduces the idiosyncratic risk7, and the 
investor ends up with a more efficient way of accessing systematic risk8. This is probably 
why diversified portfolios have become so popular. However, when you diversify a lot, you 
typically end up with a portfolio that will perform in line with the benchmark for that 
universe. Thus, diversification encourages investors to stop thinking and virtually hand over 
the investment decisions to the provider of the benchmark index. This is very far from 
controlling risk. What if systematic risk is a misconception? What if beta calculations are 
misleading?  A well diversified portfolio will achieve a lower tracking error9, but that does 
not make investors rich and should not make them sleep better at night. Targeting a low 
tracking error could easily wipe out the positive effects of diversification because this implies 
that the fund must give a large weight to stocks that have already rallied, regardless of 
fundamentals.  
 
While I believe diversification within an equity mandate is of less relevance, diversification at 
the level of asset classes is much more important. However, outside the equity and bond space 
it is difficult to find truly uncorrelated assets. This is acknowledged by the fund industry, and 
a lot of effort is being put into bringing new types of assets with low correlation to equities on 
to the market. Some of these vehicles work rather well, particularly in the hedge fund space, 
but also within infrastructure, real estate, commodities, and different types of risk trading in 
for example longevity risk or in natural disasters (!) Unfortunately, regulators around the 
world, Norway included, are typically considering many of these vehicles to be dubious and 
risky, and the lack of transparency makes them more demanding for the individual investor. 
However, as the industry matures and regulators become more familiar with the products, 
such investments will be of greater importance for portfolio managers.  
 
Norway has currently a strict cap on alternative investments for pension fund managers, and, 
as a consequence, these managers are forced to channel their risk budget to equity, bonds and 
real estate. More timely regulations to improve potential asset diversification effects one can 
hope for.  
 
 
Proposition: Illiquidity is a good harvest for long term investors 
 
Typically, assets that are difficult to trade will trade with a premium because investors will 
demand compensation for the risk of not being able to sell at any given point in time. I believe 
this illiquidity premium is a very attractive premium to harvest. To my surprise however, 
investors with a short time horizon tend to go after this premium. When investing in illiquid 
assets, the investor must be patient and wait for the right entry and exit opportunities. An 
investor with strong liquidity constraints could under certain conditions turn out to be a forced 
seller, something which is normally incompatible with this premium. So hedge funds are not 
the ideal vehicle to take on a lot of liquidity risk. Long term investors are.  
 
                                                 
7 Risk related to the specific asset that can be diversified away 
8 Market risk 
9 Tracking error is the volatility of the difference in return between a portfolio and its benchmark index. 
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One example illustrates my point. As I suggested above, high volatility stocks and stocks with 
recent strong performance were sold off first during the market turmoil in the fall of 2007. 
Fundamental factors were harder to observe. As traders had to deleverage their positions, 
shares were forced out in a market where risk aversion had increased significantly. Part of the 
rise in risk aversion might have been taken out as a rise in the liquidity premium (something I 
should have, but haven’t yet analysed) and so the forced seller might have taken bigger losses 
in liquid shares (which is by the way also according to the CAPM framework). 
 
Illiquidity does not necessarily mean higher fundamental risk; it only means that you have to 
have a longer time horizon on your investment. Perfect for a pension fund, but not too good 
for traders. 
 
Again, pension fund managers are typically held back by regulators to invest in illiquid assets 
like private equity and unlisted stocks, while they probably are the better investors for these 
assets. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Several of the points I have made are rather basic criticisms of the CAPM model. Even 
though these arguments are well known, the investment community continues to develop 
models based on standard CAPM methodology, fund managers try to optimize their portfolios 
using Markowitz, and we keep analysing stock risk premiums using ‘beta’ models. Why? 
Probably because it is simple and because it is a consistent and well known framework where 
you can obtain clear cut conclusions and where most of the people you talk to recognize the 
analysis. That is why we probably will continue to make similar experiences in the future 
when correlations change, when history does not repeat itself, when distributions are not 
normal, and when there is asymmetric information or there are sudden changes in liquidity 
conditions.  
 
Professor Lars E .O. Svensson, in discussing the optimal interest rate path for a central bank, 
argues that “it has to look good”. That goes for investments too. If the model tells you 
something that does not look good, it probably is not. 
 
The market will repeat previous errors. Here are a few to watch out for: 
 
1. When we remove the possibility of human error, we also remove common sense. 
2. Forecast based trading is not a stable source of alpha, particularly not in efficient or 
near efficient markets. 
3. Historical relations do change. Do not base your investment models on them. 
4. It is impossible to target volatility in difficult markets. 
5. Academics are not managers. The real world is different. 
6. Diversification is good, but works best across asset classes.  
 
I would like to illustrate how we at OPF implement our thinking in some of the asset classes. 
First, it is possible in Norway to book equity at historical cost rather than mark-to-market. 
OPF has made some very concentrated investments in a few Nordic companies categorized as 
“hold-to-maturity stocks”. The total return from these stocks in the accounts is then simply the 
dividend yield plus realized returns. The trade off for OPF is that we give away liquidity 
(because we have to hold the stocks to “maturity” defined as more than 12 months), and in 
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return are able to take a longer view. In this way we have incentives to invest in companies 
with a similar long term horizon for their operations. Typically our portfolio consists of 
companies with a stable cash flow and high dividends. Regardless of accounting principles, I 
believe that these are sound investment criteria for a long term investor. We know our 
companies rather well, we have the capacity to engage in our investments, and we can 
construct a portfolio with attractive risk characteristics even though it might look risky from a 
pure diversification point of view.  
 
Another important investment for us has been in the infrastructure space. These investments 
are typically organized as a limited partnership. Again, these types of vehicles are subject to 
rather strict regulations while ordinary equity funds are not, the reason being that limited 
partnerships historically have been associated with higher risk, and probably also because 
they are not operating on regulated markets. This is unfortunate. The liquidity premium in 
these funds should on the contrary be a very attractive harvest for long term investors. 
Remember diversification between asset classes is fare more effective than diversification 
within an asset class.  
 
Finally, we have in OPF engaged in real estate investments and have recently increased our 
exposure here significantly. Again we focus on long term returns and low operational risk. 
What we find particularly attractive is the excellent hedge against inflation risk and the low 
capital depreciation rate of real estate. In fact, one could argue that the depreciation rate is 
lower than the discounting rate because land is a scarce resource that will have a positive 
inflation adjusted return over time. To further reduce our risk we focus on tenants with 
superior credit quality, long duration of contracts, high net discounted value of property and 
excellent location. In this way we are able to invest in an asset class that provides limited risk 
of a permanent capital loss, low ownership costs, and stable returns above the risk free rate. 
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